Since passive leakage information analysis and active fault injection attacks on naive implementation of the Rivest, Shamir, and Adelman (RSA) cryptosystem can be used to retrieve a secret key, several countermeasures against these attacks have been developed. In this paper, we point out that the horizontal correlation power analysis (HCPA) attack can be applied to the square-multiply ladder exponentiation algorithm and its variants, which are used for secure RSA implementation. Furthermore, we propose a novel exponentiation algorithm to defeat previous implementation attacks, as well as the HCPA attack, in particular. This algorithm is designed to overcome weakness against the HCPA attack by adopting an intermediate message update technique based on an extended modulus. We can employ the proposed exponentiation algorithm to implement a secure Chinese remainder theorem-based RSA (CRT-RSA) cryptosystem by thwarting the Bellcore attack.
Introduction
To provide high-level security, most cryptosystems are typically implemented on hardware devices using a microprocessor, a smart card chip, a co-processor, and so on. Although cryptographic algorithms adopted in these systems are theoretically secure, their naive implementations on an embedded module can easily be attacked. We can classify these implementation attacks into passive side-channel analysis and active fault injection attacks. In the passive attack, an adversary exploits leakage information, such as execution time, power consumption, or electromagnetic radiation. The active attack can be accomplished by injecting a fault into the device during execution of the cryptographic algorithm. The Rivest, Shamir, and Adelman (RSA) cryptosystem, which signs or encrypts a message, is one of the most popular public key cryptosystems (Rivest et al., 1978) . The core operation of an RSA implementation is modular exponentiation composed of multiplications and squarings. The Chinese remainder theorem-based RSA (CRT-RSA) algorithm (Couvreur and Quisquater, 1982) was adopted in particular to speed up computation time, in comparison to the standard RSA mode. Since the private key of the RSA cryptosystem is used as an exponent in the exponentiation operation to sign or decrypt a message, naive implementation of exponentiation becomes the main target of side-channel analysis and fault injection attacks.
Among the several side-channel attacks based on power analysis of an RSA implementation, simple power analysis (SPA) and differential power analysis (DPA) are considered as the most serious threats (Kocher et al., 1999; Coron, 1999; Messerges et al., 1999 ). An SPA attack can be accomplished by distinguishing the power consumption between multiplication and squaring during execution of exponentiation. On the other hand, an attacker using DPA collects many power signal traces and manipulates them using statistical properties. In a fault attack (FA) on RSA, the attacker injects a fault to throw a security device into confusion during the exponentiation computation procedure, then investigates the faulty outputs obtained from the target device, and finally, extracts the secret key by analysing them (Boneh et al., 1997; Lenstra, 1996; Giraud, 2005; Kim and Quisquater, 2007) .
To thwart passive power analysis (PA) attacks and active FAs on RSA, various exponentiation algorithms have been proposed. Among them, many countermeasures have been developed to simultaneously defeat SPA and the FA. The Montgomery ladder (Joye and Yen, 2002 ), Joye's square-multiply ladder (Joye, 2009) , and the atomicity-based exponentiation algorithm (Chevallier-Mames et al., 2004) are prominent countermeasures to prevent both SPA and FA, including the C-safe error attack . In addition, the Boscher, Handschuh, and Trichina (BHT) exponentiation method (Boscher et al., 2009) is well known as a countermeasure that can simultaneously deter the SPA, DPA, and FA. In particular, naive implementation of the CRT-RSA algorithm retains critical vulnerability to CRT-based FA [the so-called Bellcore attack (Boneh et al., 1997; Lenstra, 1996) ]. Since this attack can easily break the CRT-RSA cryptosystem by injecting just one fault, many countermeasures that are categorised as test-based or infective-based methods, have been proposed (Shamir, 1999; Yen et al., 2001; Rauzy and Guillry, 2014) .
Nevertheless, most countermeasure algorithms were proposed to deal separately with side-channel attacks and FAs. Amiel et al. (2007) proposed the passive and active combined attack (PACA) on the square-and-multiply exponentiation algorithm, and they proved that some exponentiation algorithms resistant to SPA and DPA are also vulnerable to PACA. In addition, Kim et al. (2016) proved that the SPA/FA-resistant Boscher, Naciri, and Prouff (BNP) exponentiation algorithm (Boscher et al., 2007) can reveal the secret key through PACA. More recently, Su et al. (2015) showed that the BHT algorithm, which is an extended version of BNP for defeating DPA, is also vulnerable to PACA, and they proposed a new exponentiation algorithm to defeat PACA.
Furthermore, Clavier et al. (2010) presented a different type of PA attack called the horizontal correlation power analysis (HCPA) attack, which was motivated by the big mac attack (Walter, 2001) . In an HCPA attack, the adversary calculates the power consumption correlations between two segment computations in a single power trace of an exponentiation, and analyses them to retrieve the secret key (Witteman et al., 2011) . Here, segment means one unit of operation (for instance, modular multiplication or squaring). In Bauer et al. (2013b) [see, Bauer et al. (2015) and Danger et al. (2016) for extended versions] were able to perform an improved big mac attack on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). To defeat an HCPA attack, some countermeasures using message blinding or operand randomisation in long integer multiplication (Bauer et al., 2013a) can be adopted.
In this paper, we focus on proving that some countermeasures, such as square-and-multiply-always and Joye's square-multiply ladder algorithm, are open to the HCPA attack, and we find a secure and efficient RSA exponentiation algorithm to prevent the various side-channel attacks and FAs, including HCPA attack. This paper first shows that the secret key used in Joye's square-multiply ladder and Su it et al.'s algorithm might be revealed by the HCPA attack. Based on a weakness analysis of Su et al.'s algorithm, this paper proposes a novel exponentiation algorithm to defeat PA, FA, PACA, and especially, HCPA attack. Furthermore, the proposed algorithm can be employed in CRT-RSA implementation in order to guarantee security by defeating the Bellcore attack.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we give an overview of the standard RSA cryptosystem and its CRT-RSA mode, and describe critical side-channel attacks and FAs on them. Then, we show that Joye's square-multiply ladder algorithm and Su et al.'s exponentiation algorithm are still vulnerable to HCPA attack in Section 3, and explain the new exponentiation algorithm designed to overcome previous implementation attacks, particularly HCPA attack. Section 4 describes a CRT-RSA implementation method adopting the proposed PA/FA/PACA/HCPA-resistant algorithm.
Section 5 provides a comparison of the security and efficiency of the proposed algorithm with existing countermeasures. Finally, conclusions are in Section 6.
RSA cryptosystem and implementation attacks

The exponentiation algorithm
The RSA public key cryptosystem is widely used to encrypt or sign messages. To provide a security service using the RSA cryptosystem, a user prepares a public modulus, N , which is the product of two secret prime numbers, p and q. The length of N is denoted by l. Let e be the public key. The private key, d, is the modular inverse of e, satisfying e · d = 1 mod φ(N ), where φ denotes Euler's totient function. Here, private key d can be expressed in a binary:
, and should be kept secret by its owner.
The standard RSA operation for signing message M can be achieved by performing a modular exponentiation:
In this RSA exponentiation, secret key d is used as an exponent. After receiving the signature, S, and message, M , from the signer, the verification is accomplished by checking whether S e mod N is equal to M or not. The user occasionally computes M = C d mod N to decrypt encrypted message C. The exponentiation algorithm performs multiplication and squaring operations in a sequential manner according to the bit patterns of the exponent.
CRT-RSA exponentiation is usually adopted (Couvreur and Quisquater, 1982) to speed up the standard RSA computation and reduce the size of the processing data. In CRT-RSA mode, two exponentiations (S p = M dp mod p and
, respectively. Then, final signature, S, is constructed using Gauss's recombination method:
where both I q = q −1 mod p and I p = p −1 mod q can be pre-computed to save computation time.
Implementation attacks on RSA cryptosystem
The attacker's final objective, obtained by breaking the RSA cryptosystem, is to retrieve the private key or the two prime numbers. Among various power analysis attacks, the SPA attack can retrieve the secret information by measuring a single power trace that occurs during an operation in modular exponentiation, whereas in DPA, an attacker collects hundreds of power traces. Then, statistical signal processing technology can be used to determine the secret bits. To protect against a DPA attack, we can use the randomisation techniques applied to the message, exponent, and modulus.
The binary square-and-multiply algorithm is typically considered to implement RSA exponentiation, in which secret key d is bit-wisely scanned. However, it is known that the secret key used in this exponentiation algorithm can easily be retrieved by the SPA attack. To counter an SPA attack, some regularity-based countermeasures were developed, such as square-and-multiply-always, the Montgomery ladder, and Joye's square-multiply ladder exponentiation algorithm. For the following descriptions, Joye's square-multiply ladder algorithm for simultaneously defeating SPA and C-safe error attacks is shown in Figure 1 . 
In Amiel et al. (2007) proposed a new combined attack that is first applied to the atomicity-based square-and-multiply algorithm. To obtain the faulty power trace, the attacker inserts a fault during execution of the exponentiation, which forces it to maintain a value of the dedicated register with the initial state. By this fault effect, the attacker can find two different power consumption patterns in a power signal measured from faulty computation of the exponentiation, and finally, can retrieve the secret key. Furthermore, Su et al. (2015) showed that the BHT algorithm, which is an extended version of BNP for defeating DPA, is also vulnerable to PACA, and they proposed a new exponentiation algorithm to defeat PACA. Su et al.'s countermeasure algorithm described in Figure 2 was inspired by Joye's square-multiply ladder algorithm to prevent SPA, DPA, FA, and PACA. This countermeasure uses the intrinsic property of Joye's algorithm, in which the other register is affected despite a fault injection on one register.
Although the square-and-multiply-always algorithm adopting a message blinding countermeasure can defeat SPA and DPA, it is vulnerable to the aforementioned HCPA attack. In the HCPA attack, an adversary computes the correlation factors between two power signal segments and uses them to investigate the relationship between two adjacent secret bits. Since an HCPA attack requires a single power trace measured in exponentiation computing, some countermeasures using message blinding or operand randomisation in long integer multiplication can be adopted to defeat it. In the next section, this paper clearly shows that the SPA/DPA/FA/PACA-resistant Su et al. (2015) countermeasure can also be broken by the HCPA attack.
Classic FAs often exploit the difference between a correct and a faulty output to deduce the secret information. However, the C-safe error attack can retrieve the secret bits, even if a fault causes no effect on the final output. The principle of this attack is to exploit faults while dummy operations are performed. To deter the C-safe error attack, using dummy operations in an exponentiation algorithm should be avoided. Indeed, the Montgomery ladder, Joye's square-multiply ladder, and the atomicity-based exponentiation algorithm can be employed to defeat a C-safe error attack. Table 1 presents the summary of above implementation attacks and design principles to counteract against them. 
Generate a large random integer r1 and a relatively small random integer r2 The Bellcore attack Boneh et al. (1997) was presented to break the CRT-RSA mode cryptosystem. In detail, the attacker injects an intensive fault during exponentiation in modulo p, S p = M dp mod p, and computes faulty intermediate value S p , which will generate the final faulty signature, S, as follows:
If faulty signature, S, and the correct signature, S, for the same message are exposed, secret prime number q can easily be revealed through the following computation:
The prime integer p can be deduced by factorisation of product number N , and then secret key d is retrieved based on knowing public information e. After that, an enhanced version of the Bellcore attack was proposed by Lenstra (1996) . This can more easily execute the Bellcore attack when obtaining only faulty signature S. Indeed, the attacker can successfully recover q as follows:
In order to thwart the Bellcore attack, various types of CRT-RSA countermeasures have been proposed. Among them, Shamir's method (Shamir, 1999 ) presents a simple and distinct CRT-RSA exponentiation algorithm based on the test-based method. In spite of a shortcoming whereby this method cannot detect a fault occurring in the final recombination step (Aumüller et al., 2002) , several variants of Shamir's method have been proposed to counteract the Bellcore attack (Kim and Quisquater, 2007; Amiel et al., 2007; Aumüller et al., 2002; Blömer et al., 2003) .
Proposal of an exponentiation algorithm resistant to side-channel and FAs
Horizontal correlation analysis attack
In 2015, Su et al. proposed a new exponentiation algorithm to defeat PACA as well as SPA, DPA, and FAs. Their countermeasure was inspired by Joye's square-multiply ladder exponentiation algorithm, in which all register values are affected, despite fault injection on a register during the exponentiation operation. However, Joye's algorithm, shown in Figure 1 , can be intrinsically attacked via HCPA using an input collision scenario (Feix et al., 2014) . In more detail, an attacker can find collision locations inside the exponentiation iterations, as follows:
for multiplication in step 5 is the same input as multiplication step 5 in the next iteration,
• If Figure 2 ) is still vulnerable to the HCPA attack, regardless of the random modulus extension:
for multiplication in step 8 is the same input as multiplication step 8 in the next iteration,
• If 
Exponentiation algorithm resistant to HCPA and other implementation attacks
Based on the aforementioned analysis of implementation attacks and countermeasures, we propose a novel exponentiation algorithm to resist the HCPA attack, as well as other previous attacks. To design an improved algorithm, we introduce an extended ring, Z t·N , called the overring of Z N . Moreover, ring Z t denotes a subring of Z t·N . Compared to large integer N , t is a relatively small number. In the proposed countermeasure, we generate two random numbers, r and k, compute an additive message-blinding parameter, U = r · N , and an extended modulus,
In the proposed countermeasure algorithm, an important relationship between the two parameters, U and N ′ , is that N ′ is a multiple of U . 
Generate two random numbers r and k 2.
The proposed exponentiation algorithm shown in Figure 3 is motivated by the fact that Joye's square-multiply ladder algorithm and its variants are robust against many implementation attacks besides the HCPA attack. To defeat HCPA, as well as SPA, DPA, FAs, and PACA, the following techniques are basically applied to Joye's algorithm with an extended modulus.
Additive-input and modulus blinding to prevent DPA attack
To simultaneously prevent both DPA and the chosen-message SPA attacks, the message-blinding method can be one of the more ingenious countermeasures. Among several message-blinding technologies, such as additive-input blinding, multiplicative-input blinding, and modulus blinding (Clavier and Feix, 2013; Courrege et al., 2010) , one or more methods can be adopted. An intermediate message can be concealed by additive-input and modulus-blinding countermeasures using two random values, r and k, such as
The first technique, presented as additive-input blinding, replaces M with M + U . The second presents modulus blinding by replacing N with N ′ . Here, let r or k be a 32-bit (or larger) random integer to ensure proper levels of security. Basically, the chosen-message SPA and DPA attacks can be achieved when all exponentiation algorithms with known input messages are performed on the same ring Z N . Therefore, given N ′ = t · N , the exponentiations to resist these side-channel attacks always use a different ring, Z N ′ , instead of Z N . As shown in the operations in steps 3 and 4 of the proposed algorithm, two registers are configured by adding U = r · N to the initial values. The main objective of this additive-input blinding method is to defeat chosen-message SPA attacks performed by intensively manipulating an input message. Furthermore, by adopting both additive-input and modulus-blinding methods, the adversary cannot guess intermediate register values stored during the loop operation of exponentiation. Therefore, the proposed algorithm can basically thwart the DPA attack.
Intermediate value update of two registers to prevent HCPA attack and PACA
In order to prevent an HCPA attack, the input used in multiplication of the i-th iteration loop should not be used as input for multiplication or squaring in loop (i + 1). Thus, the intermediate input value for multiplication in the current loop should be added with a random value, U . Nevertheless, this update input should not affect the exponentiation result; that is, the final value should be the same as the output after normal execution of exponentiation. The register value of an iteration loop based on an extended modulus is updated with additive blinding, while holding the same meaning in an original modulus. Indeed, if S 0 is updated to S 1 , like S 1 = S 0 + (r · N ) mod (k · r · N ), then the relationships, such that S 1 = S 0 mod N and S 1 = S 0 mod r, are retained.
As we see in step 9 of Figure 3 , the intermediate value in the i-th iterative operation is updated with additive blinding parameter U by computing
This updated value for S[d i ] is used as input to the squaring in step 7 or as input to the multiplication in step 8 in iteration (i + 1), according to secret bit d i+1 .
Here, the update point in time for register S[d i ] is an important factor. Consequently, the update time of this value does not come before modular multiplication in an iteration loop, but after it. If the register value is updated before modular multiplication, then an attacker can retrieve the relationship of two adjacent bits, because the updated value (the input of multiplication S[d i ]) can again be used as input for squaring in the next iteration. By updating with an additive random number, U , the attacker cannot find any input collision between the multiplication of step 8 in the current iterative operation and the squaring (or multiplication) in the next iteration. Consequently, the improved exponentiation algorithm can thwart the HCPA attack by updating the value in register S[d i ] in each iterative operation.
When considering the PACA model with the proposed algorithm, we assume that an attacker attempts to skip initialisation processing in step 3 of Algorithm 3 by injecting a fault. If step 3 is bypassed, owing to the fault injection, then the value of register S[0] is retained with an initial value, such as S[0] = 0. According to such a faulty execution, two distinct power consumption patterns can be found in steps 7 and 8 when the d 0 bit is 1 in the first iteration. Nevertheless, since the message update of S[0] occurs in step 10, S[0] ̸ = 0, the attacker cannot identify power consumption patterns anymore. Even if the attacker can obtain a power trace after skipping step 3, and can analyse it using an SPA method, secret exponent d is not retrieved. Furthermore, although this attack is applied in order to skip the initialisation operation for S[1] in step 4, the message update techniques in steps 9 and 10 can emasculate PACA on a similar principle.
Coherence test to prevent a FA
In the following, we use a test-based statement for simple description of the fault-injection checking method, because a test-based method can be replaced with an infective-based one, and vice versa, as shown by Rauzy and Guillry (2014) . The proposed algorithm adopts coherence test mechanisms on three intermediate values: the exponent d, results of exponentiations based on an extended modulus, and the final value of the signature, based on reduction modulo N .
To verify whether exponent bit d i during iteration operations is well used without errors, the coherence test in step 13 is conducted after performing steps 5, 11, and 12. To confirm the final two register values (S[0] and S[1] generated after steps 8 and 9), we compute reference value c = M 2 l mod r in step 14 and check the equality with
respectively, the c becomes
In addition, the coherence test of step 17 is used to check the correct signature by verifying that modular reduction in step 16, based on modulus N , has no errors.
Application to CRT-RSA
The proposed exponentiation algorithm described in the previous chapter can be applied to thwart the Bellcore attack. In CRT-RSA mode, we basically compute two exponentiations based on secret primes p and q. A simplified exponentiation algorithm from Figure 3 can be used only for CRT-RSA. The modified exponentiation version shown in Figure 4 can basically defeat the FA and attacks using SPA, DPA, PACA and HCPA. Here, we assume that the length of n is half that of modulus N , and a bit number of d p or d q denoted by m is l/2. In the modified algorithm, subring Z r is used to check whether two exponentiations are compromised. In order to reduce the computational cost, the proposed algorithm directly computes c = S[0] · S[1] mod r in step 12, which is the same as checking the value for c = M dp · M The main function of the CRT-RSA algorithm for defeating the aforementioned implementation attacks is described in Figure 5 . To verify the correctness of CRT-RSA computation, checking processes for two modular exponentiations and a recombination procedure are required. For two CRT-RSA exponentiations, we generate two random numbers, r and k, and call the subfunction in Algorithm 5 : CRT-RSA resistant to the Bellcore attack (M, p, q, dp, dq, Ip, Iq) Input: M, p, q, dp, dq, Ip, Iq 
return(S) 8. else return ('Error') After two exponentiations, the check values c p and c q returned through two subfunctions are compared. The correctness of the coherence test in step 4 of Figure 5 is verified as follows:
As a result, every fault that occurred in the two exponentiations can be detected by using only a simple coherence test in subring Z r . After Gauss's recombination process, two coherence tests in step 6 of Figure 5 are performed in subrings Z p and Z q , respectively. The aim of these processes is to verify whether the modular reductions in step 14 of Figure 4 and the recombination in step 5 of Figure 5 are affected or not. To conduct these coherence tests, the values S ′ p , S ′ q , T p , and T q are returned through two exponentiation subfunctions, as shown in steps 2 and 3 of Figure 5 . After that, we use these values to check the correctness of final signature S.
To verify the correctness of the recombination process, suppose that the value of S q in step 3 of Figure 5 is damaged by a fault injection. Then, faulty signature S in step 5 is generated as follows:
In this case, since S mod p in step 5 is equal to S p , the first coherence test of step 6 passes. Nevertheless, based on the fact that the value of S mod q is not S q , the equality in the second test of step 6 is not satisfied. On the contrary, if the value of S p in step 2 of Figure 5 is harmed, the first coherence test does not pass. Consequently, the proposed CRT-RSA algorithm can defeat the Bellcore attack by checking the relation of values returned through the subfunctions.
Comparison of security and efficiency
With regard to robustness against several implementation attacks, Table 2 compares the security of the proposed algorithm with existing countermeasures. As mentioned earlier, the square-and-multiply-always and Joye's square-multiply ladder algorithms are vulnerable to DPA attack whenever they do not adopt extra countermeasures. In this regard, the BHT algorithm, Su et al.'s algorithm, and the proposed algorithm use the multiplicative-input, additive-input, and modulus-blinding methods to defeat a DPA attack.
The BNP exponentiation algorithm and its extended version, the BHT algorithm, are still vulnerable to PACA. Despite robustness against PACA, Joye's square-multiply ladder and Su et al.'s algorithm can be broken under an HCPA attack. The proposed algorithm intrinsically has the SPA/DPA/FA/PACA-resistant security properties of the Su et al. (2015) algorithm. Furthermore, this algorithm is designed to principally defeat the HCPA attack by adopting an additive message update technique based on the extended modulus. (Coron, 1999) (Joye, 2009 As shown in the proposed algorithm in Figure 3 , exponentiation in overring Z N ′ instead of Z N of the classical algorithm increases the computational load. The proposed algorithm requires more operational time due to modular multiplication based on the extended modulus. The extra computational load such as modular reduction, update processing, and check-value computing based on a small modulus r, are negligible compared to modular exponentiation. The modular multiplication in an l-bit modulus generally takes O(l 2 )-bit multi-precision operations. Considering only the extra complexity increased by extending the modulus, the proposed algorithm requires more computing time of about 6.3% (≈ ((2, ╧048 + 64)/2, 048) 2 × 100%) compared to Joye's, in case of |N | = 2048 and |r| = |k| = 32.
Conclusions
A naive RSA implementation on embedded devices can be attacked via information leakage or fault injections occurring during the exponentiation operation. We first point out that the SPA/DPA/FA/PACA-resistant (Su et al., 2015) exponentiation algorithm is vulnerable to the HCPA attack. Based on analysis of the weak point in the original square-multiply ladder exponentiation algorithm, this paper propose an improved exponentiation algorithm that is designed to resist SPA, DPA, FA, PACA, and especially, HCPA. The proposed exponentiation algorithm can be adaptively applied to CRT-RSA implementations based on a slight modification. In particular, values returned after two exponentiation operations in CRT-RSA are effectively used to thwart an FA, like the Bellcore attack.
In comparison with the existing RSA exponentiation algorithm, the proposed method can a guarantee better security level against various implementation threats, even though it has a negligible increase in time complexity. According to analysis of the results for security and efficiency, the proposed algorithm is well suited to implementing a fast and strong RSA cryptosystem in low-resource embedded devices.
